Economies of scale in the U.S. life insurance industry : an econometric analysis by Daula, Thomas Vincent
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN
THE U.S. LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
by
THOMAS V. DAULA
U.S. Military Academy, B.S., 1974
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
May 1976
7-
Signature of
Certified by
Author .. r.! . d . ....... ... ;-* .... ..................
Department of Economics, May 1 , 1976
..... .. ......... ............... ..................
\ Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by ............. 4... .-... ".:•-•........ ..............
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students
ARCHIVES
JUL 9 1976
NIft"AR'& t
-ii-
Abstract
This thesis provides new evidence on the existence of
economies of scale in the life insurance industry. New insights
in this area are obtained by employing a composite output measure
in our estimation of long-run average cost curves for this industry.
The use of such a measure enables us to avoid pitfalls which produced
inconsistent estimates in prior studies. In addition to introducing
consistent estimation techniques, we also utilize more efficient
estimation procedures than previous analyses. Our findings indicate
that the introduction of these improved procedures does not alter
the conclusion of past studies that statistically and economically
significant economies of scale are present in the U.S. life insur-
ance industry. Finally, we note in our concluding remarks avenues
of future research in this area.
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I. Introduction
Information concerning economies of scale has important influ-
ence on the analysis of the structure and functioning of an industry.
This information is valuable not only to managers of a given industry,
but also, in the case of a regulated industry such as life insurance,
to the administrators of various regulatory commissions who depend on
such information in evaluating the consequences of their actions. The
range and the depth of this issue has been astutely summarized by
Joskow in the following passage:
Substantial cost advantages for very large scale
operations could indicate substantial barriers to
entry and the possibility that large firms could
set prices substantially above marginal cost
without providing competitive entry. At the same
time the presence of a large number of small, high
cost fringe firms may indicate that large companies
...have succeeded in keeping prices above the com-
petitive level, thus protecting inefficient producers.
In this paper, we will evaluate the case for the existence of
economies of scale in the U.S. life insurance industry. Although
various previous authors have consistently discovered such economies
in their analyses, their results are open to question on both proce-
dural and theoretical grounds. By introducing a composite output
measure, and by utilizing superior estimation techniques, this study
is able to shed new insights on the robustness of past results. In
so doing, we hope to bring the current body of knowledge a step closer
to providing a definitive answer to this problematic question.
-2-
Introduction
1. Joskow, p. 384.
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II. Economies of Scale, Cost Function Theory, and General Estimation
Problems
In this study, we will attempt to determine if there exists
valid empirical evidence that economies of scale are present in the
U.S. life insurance industry. Returns to scale is a technological con-
cept whereby such economies are said to be present when a proportional
increase in all factors of production produces an even greater propor-
tional increase in output. That is, if we specify the production func-
tion as, Q = f(X1,X2,...,Xm), and expand all of our inputs by some con-
stant factor X so that aQ = f(XX,XX 2,..." Xm); then decreasing, constant,
or increasing returns to scale are said to be present as a > X.
Although returns to scale is a technological concept which
is defined in terms of the production function, we will employ a cost
function approach in our attempt to determine if such scale economies
are present in the U.S. life insurance industry. The decision to uti-
lize a cost function methodology is based on the difficulties encountered
in trying to adapt production theory to an industry such as insurance.
The insurance industry is a service industry which produces a multitude
of products. Because of this fact, it is extremely difficult to merely
identify the output, let alone specify a functional relationship which
would describe how the various outputs are produced from the many factors
employed by an insurance firm.
While the use of a cost function greatly simplifies the nature
of the problem, it may result in the clouding of the interpretation of
the results. In particular, we must be careful not to mistake pecuniary
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returns to cost, which stem from induced factor price changes, for the
economies of scale which we seek to measure. While such factor price
differentials are not likely to be a significant source of cost savings
for large insurance firms because of the lack of specificity of the
majority of the factors employed by these firms, we must recognize the
possibility that such an occurance will influence the shape of the
average cost function, and thereby distort our results. A second pos-
sible source of distortion is the chance of mistaking returns to sub-
stitution, in which factor proportions change as output varies, for
scale economies. The occurance of either or both of these factors will
cause a downward slope to the average cost curve, which, as we will
see below, is also indicative of scale economies. For this reason,
Kamerschen and Pascusci (1969) recommend the use of the term cost
1
economies for empirical studies which utilize cost functions. In
order to avoid confusion, however, this report, while recognizing
the above caveats, will continue to employ the term economies of scale
in its analysis.
To better understand the theory underlying our use of cost
functions to determine the existence of scale economies, we will first
review a rigorous statement of the relation between the occurance of
returns to scale and the shape of the average cost curve recently made
by Igmar Sandmo (1970). Let X denote the quantity of output, and let
v. represent the amount of factor i(i = 1,...,m) utilized in the pro-1
duction of X. Thus we have that
X = f(V1 ,...,Vm). (1)1 m(
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Consider a proportional increase in each factor by 100k%, so that
ketX = f(kV1 ,...,kV m)  (2)
where t is the scale elasticity of output. Differentiation with
respect to k gives
Sk -1X = Ef.V.. (3)i 1
Now kE-1X = f/k, implies that
E = kE f.v./f (4)
Without loss of generality let us set k = 1.
Total costs are given by
C Z wiv i  (5)
where the w. are the factor prices. If we assume profit maximization,
which in turn implies cost minimization for each level of output, we
have that each firm maximizes (5) subject to (1). Forming the correspond-
ing Lagrangian and differentiating produces the following first order
conditions for cost minimization
wi  f i = 0 (i = ,...,m) . (6)
Equations 1 and 6 provide us with m+l equations to determine vi and X
as functions of w. and X. If we take factor prices as given, this
allows us to write cost as of function of output, i.e.
C = C(X).
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Differentiating equations 5 and 1, we get that,
dC = Zw.dv.1 1
dX = Ef.dv.i 1
or upon substitution from (6) that
dC = AZfidv i = AdX
Thus, we get that the multiplier gives us the marginal cost at X, i.e.
dC
-- = . (7)
Now define average cost to be denoted b(X) = C(X)/X. Differentiating
with respect to X gives
db 1 dC
-- = -X [-- x - C]
dX X dX
which implies that
db < dC C(X)
- > 0 as >
dX dX X
Substituting from (7), (6) and (1), we get
db Efiv
-- > 0 asd 0 as X > or as e < i.
dX
Therefore, we have as our result that an average
negative, positive or zero slope, as the returns
decreasing or constant.2
cost curve has a
to scale are increasing,
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It should be noted that the above result does not hold
when the firm exercizes some degree of monopsonistic
power in factor markets, since there is then no direct
connection between costs and3the purely technological
concept of returns to scale;
but that it does remain true "irrespective of whether the firm is
a price taker or not in the market for its output. 4 We should also
remember that in obtaining our result we had to assume cost minimiza-
tion, and that the firm produced a single homogeneous output.
Three general reasons are usually listed for the possible
existence of economies of scale for low ranges of output in any given
industry. These are: first, the greater ease of dealing with large
quantities; second, the spreading of risks and the resultant reduction
in the costs of uncertainty; and third, the existence of indivisibility
in both men and capital equipment.5 Because of the personal nature of
the insurance product, it is doubtful that the first rationale is very
significant for the insurance industry. While the second factor is
certainly present at the very small end of the output range, the fact
that risk spreading occurs quite rapidly for the insurance product itself,
and that investment risks may be reduced efficiently through the use
of financial intermediaries such as mutual funds indicates that this
factor's influence on average cost would become insignificant above the
very short range of the output spectrum. The third reason for the
existence of size economies is the one most often mentioned in the litera-
ture, in the sense that expanded size would better enable the use of
cost-reducing electronic data processing techniques. As the electronics
industry progresses, however, these same techniques are becoming more
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accessible to smaller firms. A fourth reason for cost economies, which
has been given for the -life insurance industry in particular, is that
larger firms may be able to attract better management through the pay-
ment of higher commissions or salaries, thereby attaining greater
operating efficiency. Because no unique management expertise is
required by life insurance firms, these firms may draw upon a large
pool of trained administrators. For this reason, we doubt that this
final source of size economies would prove to be significant for the
life insurance industry. Thus, we see that there is no strong a priori
basis for the existence of substantial size economies in insurance firms.
In conducting empirical studies in which the estimation of
cost functions is required, certain obstacles to that estimation must
be overcome, or at least accounted for. For the insurance industry,
one such obstacle is the definition of its output. As we shall see
below, a method which has been employed in the past is to use net
premiums as a proxy variable for output. Employing net premiums as
a measure of output, which is the same as measuring output as net sales,
is appropriate, however, only if the product is homogeneous, and sold
at the same prices by all companies. As we will report in the next
section, available evidence indicates that both of the above precondi-
tions fail for the life insurance product. Realizing that net premiums
is a poor measure of output, Allen in a recent paper considered three
methods of obtaining an appropriate measure of output for this industry.
These methods are: first, to construct a composite output measure;
second, to include proportions of each insurance line in the estimating
-9-
equation as explanatory variables along with net premiums; and third,
to select a sample for study in a manner that provides for premium
comparability.7 While Allen chose the latter method as the best proce-
dure available to him, we will employ a composite figure based on unit
costs of the various lines of output as our measure of the insurance
product in this study.8
A second obstacle to empirical cost studies is the problem
of defining costs. The usual practice in these studies, and the one
which we will also employ here, is to use an accounting definition of
cost. Accounting data, however, contains several flaws as a measure
of cost in the economic sense. Often mentioned in such criticisms of
accounting cost is that the distribution of depreciation of an asset
over its life cycle is usually determined by the taxation authorities
rather than by economic criteria, and that the valuation of capital
services occurs on the basis of historical price rather than at replace-
ment cost. Neither of these deficiencies, however, are of major im-
portance to insurance data since only a small portion of total costs
are determined by capital usage. Another problem with accounting cost,
which does remain important for insurance firms, because of the multi-
product nature of their output, is the often arbitrary allocation of
overhead costs by this technique. Finally, in a cross-section study,
accounting practices may vary from firm to firm, which may affect
reported costs.
The appropriate definition of cost also includes a return
to entrepreneurial initiative or risk. Accounting profit, however,
also includes any monopoly profits which may be present as well as
-10-
legitimate entrepreneurial return or costs. As a result, following
common practice, accounting profit is not considered a cost in this
study. Such an ommission of all accounting profits from cost, probably
causes an underestimation of cost . Despite this shortcoming, as
Walters points out, "one does not know whether this bias invalidates
,,10
the shape of empirical cost curves. While this potential source
of distortion must be recognized, a determination of the most effi-
cient method of correcting for this shortcoming in studies based on
accounting data is beyond the scope of this paper.
In empirical studies utilizing cost functions, a single equa-
tion approach may not be employed unless it is assumed that output is
exogenously determined with respect to individual firms, and firms mini-
mize cost. As Benston points out, these necessary assumptions appear
11
to be valid for regulated financial institutions. For life insurance
firms, those costs, such as advertising, which would affect the demand
function facing a firm, represent a very small fraction of the total
expenses incurred by any firm during the course of a year. Furthermore,
insurance is the type of product whose demand is determined primarily
by such factors as the population and income of the area in which it
is marketed. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to assume that
the insurance industry, and each firm therein, faces a stable demand
curve on the basis of which its output is exogenously determined.
In our study, the use of an aggregate output measure based
on unit costs may introduce a spurious dependence between cost and
output.12 If such a dependence is introduced in this fashion, our
-11-
aggreage output measure will lose its exogenous qualities. As a result,
even if we may assume that the "output" of an insurance firm may be
considered an exogenous variable, the output measure we employ in our
study may not possess this necessary attribute. Because of this fact,
we will employ an instrumental variable technique in our estimation
procedure to correct for any inconsistencies injected into our analysis
by the non-exogeneity of our output measure.
In conducting an empirical test for economies of scale, one
may employ either cross-sectional or time series data. The use of time
series data, however, may introduce several sources of bias into the
results. For example, prices at which costs and output are evaluated
may change over time. Alternatively, the technological process employed
by a firm may also change over time. Since we have predominantly
experienced inflationary price movements in recent years, the impacts
of the former source of distortion has probably been to impart an up-
ward bias on long-run average cost curves based on time series data.
Technological progrss, on the other hand, would have a negative effect
on the long-run average cost curve. Although the effect of price
movements over time may be corrected for to a large extent, the net
effect of the remaining price and technology changes would result in
an ambiguous bias in our empirical estimate of a long-run average
13
cost curve.
In this paper, we will conduct our empirical analysis on
the basis of cross-section data. While the use of cross-section data
avoids the problems associated with changing conditions over time which
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distort time series studies, it presents our analysis with a different
set of problems. In attempting to determine the existence of size
economies on the basis of a long-run average cost curve, we must assume
that all the firms in our cross-section are using the same technology
or production function to produce their output. This assumption appears
to be plausible for a service industry such as insurance. Furthermore,
minor differences between firms, which may cause variations about the
cost-scale line, are unlikely to impart a systematic bias to the shape
of an average cost curve produced by cross-sectional analysis.14
The use of cross-section data has been objected to by Friedman
on the basis of two observations by him. The first is that in a com-
petitive framework, with no specialized factors of production, the
average cost curve would be the same for all the firms. in the cross-
section, and each firm would be producing the same level of output.
Friedman went on to argue that in such a context, differences in out-
put between firms would only be attributable either to mistakes or the
existence of specialized factors of production unique to individual firms.
If the capital market and accounting system were operating efficiently,
the result of this situation would be firms operating at different out-
put levels but displaying constant average cost. Such an occurance could
mistakenly be taken for evidence of constant returns to scale.15
Johnston has correctly pointed out that this criticism by Friedman
of cross-section studies rests upon the assumption of a perfectly compe-
titive industry.16 When reality diverges from perfect competitition,
this flaw no longer applies. Such divergence, in fact, seems to be the
case in the U.S. life insurance industry. In a former study of the life
-13-
insurance industry, Belth discovered a great deal of price variance
in this industry, and "concluded that this degree of price variance
is not consistent with a perfectly competitive market."1 7
The most important criticism levelled by Friedman against
cross-section methods is the so-called "regression fallacy". According
to Friedman's view, a firm's output at any given moment in time is
likely to be the combination of an expected or normal component of out-
put, and a transient or random component. Furthermore, firms with output
-14-
above the industry mean.; at a particular point in time are more likely
to be experiencing a positive random component, than firms with output
below the industry mean. If average variable cost were constant for
these firms within their individual range of variation due to the transient
components of their output, then lowered unit costs would be expected
for firms with positive transient components. As a result, a negative
bias could be imparted to the slope of the long-run average cost curve.
As Johnston has pointed out, in making his original argument,
18
Friedman ignored the role of variable cost . If instead of the case
of constant variable outlined above, the variable costs rose sharply
as a result of the random components of output, then a positive bias to
the slope of the long-run average cost curve would result. Furthermore,
it has been argued that if output is truly subject to random fluctuations,
then the expected cost curve, and not one influenced by random fluctuations
in output, would be the relevant cost curve for decision-making purposes.
Since accounting data usually encompasses several economic periods, a
cross-sectional study utilizing this data would best approximate this
underlying expected cost curve.19
As a final point with respect to the role that Friedman's re-
gression fallacy may play in influenceing the results of this paper, it
should be noted that our sample contains firms which differ in scale
by a factor of 5,000 on the basis of our aggregate output measure. The
presence of such a variance in firm size would seem to rule out the possi-
bility of making any meaningful statement on the sign of the random com-
ponent from the observation of the relation of a firm's size to average
firm size in the sample.
-15-
Therefore, in view of the arguments made in the preceding
paragraph and the wide latitude in firm size in our sample, it is
unlikely that the regression fallacy is a serious source of distor-
tion in our results.
-16-
Theory II
1. Kamerschen, p. 494.
2. A different proof of this proposition is also given in
McElroy (1970).
3. Sandmo, p. 152.
4. Ibid.
5. Walter, p. 40.
6. Hammond, etc., p. 182.
7. Allen, p. 101.
8. Allen, in making his choice, stated his belief that at this time
net premiums are the only output measure available for research
on this topic.
9. Walters, p. 43.
10. Ibid, p. 42.
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11. Benston, p. 317.
12. Johnston (1958), p. 346.
13. Randy's Proposal.
14. Johnston (1958), p. 348.
15. Walters, p. 44.
16. Johnston (1958), p. 347.
17. Launie, P. 284.
18. Johnston (1958), p. 350.
19. Walters, pp. 48-49.
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III. Survey of the Literature
Although there have been many studies concerning the existence
of economies of scale in the general category of financial institutions,
there have been only two serious attempts to determine if such economies
exist in the life insurance industry. These studies were conducted by
Houston and Sim6n in 1971, and by S. Travis Pritchett in 1973. Before
reviewing the results of these investigations, however, we will first
review some of the work done on the more general topic concerning size econo-
mies in other forms of financial institutions. The authors of these
works faced problems in characterizing their models and testable hypo-
theses which are endemic to investigations concerning the structure of
the financial industry, and to multi-product, service industries in
general. Thus, a look at the results of these studies should be en-
lightening to the reader from a methodological viewpoint, and in addi-
tion provide him with a feel for what result he may expect from the
study on the basis of those achieved with respect to similar institutions.
George J. Benston produced a prototype paper on economies of
scale in savings and loan associations.1 Because of the problems asso-
ciated with defining output in a multi-product, service producing firm,
he chose to employ a cost function approach. In particular, he advo-
cated the use of the following general specification of the cost func-
tion in studies of this type:
-19-
c = f(Q,G,P,U)
where:
c = operating costs per period
Q = rate of output per period
G = output homogeneity variables that account for the
fact that Q is not a homogeneous measure
P = differences in factor prices, organizational struc-
ture, and management ability of firms
U = other unspecified factors.
In choosing this form, he is explicitly taking account of the fact
that one is often forced to employ a proxy variable for the measure
of output. The variable chosen is often related to sales ao a general
measure of services performed. Such a proxy will yield statistically
consistent results, however, only if the product is homogeneous in
nature, and sold at the same price across firms in the industry. While
the latter precondition is assumed, Benston recommends correcting for
the former through the use of "homogeneity variables". Benston also
notes that the use of this single-equation, cost function approach re-
quires that we assume that output is exogensouly determined and that
firms minimize cost.2
Benston decided that costs are incurred as a result of ser-
vices performed, and so measured output as the number of business trans-
actions. Using this measure of output, and a variation of the above
general form of the cost function, he found that savings and loan associa-
tions exhibited consistent and significant economies of scale for all
years studied.
-20-
There have been several studies conducted to determine if
economies of scale exist in property and liability insurance companies.
We will consider the results of three recent papers on this topic. The
first study which we will consider was conducted by Hammond, Melander
and Shilling in 1971. In that paper, they examined the relationship
between expense ratios and size based on net premiums. From the re-
sults of their analysis, they concluded that economies of scale do
exist for major non-loss costs of property and liability insurance com-
panies, and that the majority of insurance companies are of sizes
below which the economies disappear. They found no evidence of a
U-shaped average cost curve, but decided instead that the appropriate
form was L-shaped. From these results, they inferred a possible jus-
tification for the merger of smaller firms.
Two later studies on this same topic of size economies in
property and liability insurance companies differed from Hammomd, et al.,
in finding either no economies, or economies which disappeared after a
relatively small rise in the level of output. In his 1974 paper, Robert
Allen recognized that Hammond's use of net premiums as measure of out-
put was inappropriate since the product is neither homogeneous, nor
sold at the same price by all companies. In order to avoid this problem,
Allen chose to pattern his sample in a manner which would provide inter-
company comparability of output, and to use policyholders' surplus as the
measure of company size.4 With these alterations incorporated into his
model, Allen found scale economies to be unimportant beyond relatively
small output levels. In particular, whereas Hammond concluded that size
-21-
economies existed up to the range of $300-600 million in annual premiums,
Allen concluded that they extended no further than for companies writing
from $30-60 million in annual net premiums.5
An even stronger indictment than Allen's of Hammond's re-
sults can in fact be found in the form of an earlier article by Joskow,
written in 1973. In that article, he looked at the relation between
expense ratios, and size as measured by premium volume. He also cor-
rected through the use of dummy variables for the methods employed by
the companies in writing the insurance (i.e., whether they employed
direct agents, or sold through agencies). On the basis of his results,
Joskow concluded that the production of property insurance is charac-
terized by constant returns to scale. Thus, we see that while the
evidence is mixed on this issue, some of the most recent studies pro-
duce the result that economies of scale are either absent or of little
significance for property-liability insurance companies.
The first major attempt to statistically test for the exis-
tence of size economies in the life insurance industry was a study
performed by Huston and Simon (1970). In their model, they considered
three possible specifications for the long-run average cost function.
In addition, they sought to control for differences in insurance "products"
by including three variables which were defined as the ratios of industrial,
group and new premiums to total premium respectively. A variable defined
as the fraction of the insurance lapsed during the year was included to
allow for the extra costs associated with the unrecovered initial expenses
of young policies which were lapsed. They also included dummy variables
-22-
which were intended to correct for the possible influence of corporate
concentration (for this variable both a regular and an interaction
dummy variable were employed, each of which took a value of one for the
ten largest companies). The results of their tests are reproduced in
Table 1. The reader should note that the market structure variable
was omitted in their published report on the basis of its being statis-
tically insignificant in their earlier results.
A review of Houston and Simon's results shows that all of
the regression coefficients of the size variables were of the "right"
sign for their hypothesis; that is, they all indicated decreasing
average costs with increasing premiums. On the basis of these results,
these authors decided that economies of scale, as defined, are present
in the U.S. life insurance industry.
A critical analysis of their paper, however, soon uncovers
certain deficiencies in their model which make their results something
less than unequivocable. In particular, two fundamental assumptions
which are required for their model to produce consistent estimates
appear to be incorrect on the basis of available information regarding
the life insurance industry. The first of these assumptions is that
life insurance may be viewed as a homogeneous product. Although the
authors seek to correct for this deficiency in their model through the
use of three output ratio variables, this attempt contains several
obvious inadequacies. The product of the life insurance industry is
far too heterogeneous to enable the assumption of premiums as a proxy
-23-
Tablel
ov, ston and Simon
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for a homogeneous output to be acceptable after such a simple correction
device. Their method fails to correct for the basic dichotomy in the
field of ordinary insurance between term and ordinary policies where,
in the former case, premiums represent payment for the buying of a pure
insurance plan, while for the latter type of policy a major portion of
the premium represents an investment option. Also neglected was any
adjustment for the portion of the total premium income which came
from annuity considerations.
The second major failing of the underpinnings of their model
is the necessity to assume equal pricing by all firms in their sample.
The inaccuracy of this assumption was demonstrated in a study conducted
by Belth (1966). The results of this study concerning price differentials
has led to the conclusion by many that the present market for indivi-
dual life insurance is characterized by massive price ignorance. This
price ignorance is so prevalent in fact that Belth has stated in one
article,
My reference to price ignorance in the market is intended
to encompass more than price ignorance among life insurance
buyers. It is intended to include price ignorance among
life insurange agents...(and) tg encompass price ignorance
among life insurance companies.
Thus, we see that while the first of their assumptions raises doubts
concerning the validity of their model and the results stemming from
it, the second assumption's wide divergence from fact undoubtedly
interjects inconsistencies into their regression results. The exact
degree and nature of the biases emanating from these sources with respect
to the regression coefficients obtained, however, cannot be ascertained
without a detailed examination of the data which Houston and Simon
employed in reaching their results.
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In two different studies, Pritchett (1971, 1973) looked for
evidence of size economies in the life insurance industry. In both studies,
the author employed the very simple statistical technique of comparing
mean expense ratios among four arbitrarily chosen size categories of
firms. The expense ratio employed was defined to be the ratio of total
actual general expenses and commissions to a standard expense determined
on the basis of the volume of business as measured by the outputs of
several products such as the number of new policies, the amount of first-
year premiums, etc. In conducting his study, Pritchett chose his sample
so as to provide for comparability of the output for the different com-
panies. The basic results of his studies are summarized in Table II.
As we observe, Pritchett's results also imply the existence
of size economies. A test of the equality of the four average expense
9
ratios was rejected at the 5% confidence level. On the basis of these
results, Pritchett concludes that "the relationship between the size of
expense ratios and the volume of ordinary business is essentially
L-shaped with a negative slope continuing on the bottom segment". 10
In his second study, Pritchett did find evidence, however, that diseconomies
of size were present in home office expenses for the largest insurers.11
Thus, we see that we are again left with the result that economies of
scale exist in the life insurance industry at least up through the range
of medium to large scale insurance firms. This conclusion, however,
is still not firmly emplaced due to the crude methods employed in con-
ducting this study.
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Table 2
Average Cost by Size of ~irm
(Source:
Size Category
'ri tchett,
Averace Co
1971, p. 560)
(Arithmetic hean)
Standard Leviation
Small 1.1876 .1352
Med iiun 1.0835 . 1Ii12
Lar e 1.0354 .078 9
Very large I1.0069 .0 534••
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The final study which we will look at is one of the general
insurance industry of Canada conducted by Halpern and Mathewson (1975).
This study is most interesting from a methodological viewpoint. In
particular, these authors note that since inputs (costs) and outputs
are determined simultaneously by profit-maximizing firms, outputs are
stochastic. Their use as explanatory variables in ordinary least-
squares regressions by Benston, Houston and Simon and others gives rise
to biased and inconsistent estimates of regression coefficients. Any-
thing short of price or output directly fixed by regulators produces
outputs with this property.12
In order to avoid such problems, Halp .ern and Mathewson develop
a model from the first-order conditions of profit maximization. Their
final equation avoids the use of cost information altogether, and thus,
represents a reduced form of the cost-output generating system.
A general form of their model may be represented as
1 YC C  F FR-N = Z Z + e
YR YR aR
where R = premium revenue per policy
N = number of policies
ZC = an exogenous cost variable
Z = an exogenous financial cost variable.
Economies of scale are said to exist if yR < 0. Note that by avoiding
the use of cost data, this model bypasses any problems associated
with Friedman's regression fallacy, which we described above, as well
as correcting for possible simultaneous equation bias. Note also,
however, that in addition to the assumption of profit maximization,
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the use of this model, as formulated and employed by Halpern and Mathewson,
requires the assumption that the specification of the marginal revenue
and marginal cost functions as linear functions is appropriate.13
The results of their regressions, which employed several expanded
variations of their basic model, prompted two conclusions by Mathewson
and Halpern. First, Canadian joint stock insurance firms realize diver-
sification economies in the sense of lower marginal costs resulting
from writing the same dollar amount of premium revenue over more lines.
Second, Canadian mutual companies realize economies of size in the sense
of reduced marginal costs through the joint expansion of automobile and
fire/personal property insurance. In the latter instance, the economies
for the mutual firms apparently stem from the use by these firms of
the marketing technique of writing inusrance directly as opposed to
using the agency system.14 Thus, we see that through the use of their
technique, Halpern and Mathewson have reestablished some basis for the
belief in the existence of some economies of scale in the property and
liability insurance industry, after this view had been severly shaken
by Joskow's and Allen's results.
While the technique employed by Halpern and Mathewson is an
interesting method of approaching the problem of measuring size economies,
it is doubtful that it represents a major improvement over previous
methods. As we discussed above, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the insurance output is very nearly exogenous from the individual
firm's viewpoint. Furthermore, in the course of formulating the model,
which they actually employed in estimation, Halpern and Mathewson were
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forced to make several questionable assumptions in deriving their
exogenous variables (such as, the linear separability of all cost
factors of each insurance line, and that premiums by line represents
a good proxy variable for output). They also employed certain demographic
measures as exogenous variables which would be difficult for researchers
on this topic to construct. Therefore, in view of the compromising
assumptions which also are entailed under Halpern and Mathewson's model,
and because of the greater relative difficulty in its formulation, we
believe that the traditional cost function approach, in conjunction with
an instrumental variable procedure, represents a superior method of
correcting for possible simultaneous equation bias. This view is
bolstered by the fact that both methods employ single equation techniques,
and the use of instrumental variables under the cost function approach
would also correct for possible errors in variables which remain un-
corrected under Halptern and Mathewson's specification.
As we have seen, on the basis of past work in this field,
the question of whether economies of scale exist in the insurance
industry in general, and in the life insurance industry in particular,
is still unresolved. While investigations of the life insurance
have thus far produced consistent evidence that economies of scale
do exist, as opposed to the contradictory results that the examinations
of the property and liability insurance industry have brought forth,
the past work with respect to the former industry has been at best
rudimentary. For this reason, further studies of the life insurance
industry, such as the one we are attempting here, seems to be called
for at this time.
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Survey III
1. Benston (1972).
2. Ibid, p. 317.
3. Allen, 1974.
4. The choice of policyholder surplus as his size measure stemmed
from the fact that because of the method of state regulation
this variable represents a limiting condition on the output
of these companies, and thus is a measure of their capacity to
produce insurance. Allen, p. 101.
5. Allen, p. 103.
5. Joskow, p. 388.
7. Kamerschen, et al., p. 496.
8. In Kamerschen, et al., p. 496, from Belth, "Price Disclosures
in Life Insurance," Business Horizons, Vol. XI, No. 3, June 1968,
pp. 32-33.
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9. Pritchett (1971), p. 560.
10. Pritchett (1973), p. 158.
11. Ibid, p. 165.
12. Halpern and Mathewson, p. 204.
13. Ibid, p. 204.
14. Ibid, p. 205.
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IV. The Model
In testing for economies of scale in the life insurance
industry, we will use three general specifications of the average
cost function. These are:
1) AC = a + bQ +
2) AC = a + bQ + cQ 2 +
3) log (AC) = a + b log (Q) + c
where Q = aggregate output measure (as defined below)
AC = average cost = total costs/Q (with total costs
as defined below)
E = error term
Equation (1) reflects the hypothesis that average cost is linearly
related to output. Equations (2) and (3) provide for the possibility
that A.C. is non-linearly related to output. Equation (2) represents
the functional form of the U-shaped A.C. curve which is commonly re-
ferred to in the literature. Equation (3) is the average cost function
analogue to the Cobb-Douglas form of the production function.1
We showed above that the presence of economies of scale are
indicated when the A.C. function is downward sloping. For equations
(1) and (3) this property is indicated by a negative value for the b
coefficient.2 Thus, it is the value of this expression which determines
whether economies of scale are present at various ranges of outputs
for the second functional form.
In running our empirical tests we will also consider three
other variables or factors which might influence the determination of
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average cost. The first of these factors is the market or organizational
structure of the individual firms. In particular, we will explore
the possible effect upon a firm's administration of whether itis a pub-
licly owned stock company, whose managers are accountable to its owners,
or a mutual company, in which case managerial accountability is much
more ambiguous. In an effort to account for any differential in
managerial efficiency stemming from this corporate structure dichotomy,
we include a dummy variable (M.S.), which takes a value of 1 for mutual
companies, and of 0 for stock companies. The use of an interaction
dummy is rejected on the grounds that it is not economically plausible
for this dichotomy to result in the use of different technologies by
companies. While certain inefficiencies might result from mutual owner-
ship which would cause a slight upward shift in the intercept term, it
is unlikely that this factor would result in different techniques being
employed by these firms, and thereby causing a different slope for the
cost function.
The second factor which we will consider as having a possible
effect on the average cost curve is the company age. In particular, we
sought to test the hypothesis that insurance companies face initial
start-up or organizational costs which shift up the average cost curve
for young firms. In order to accomplish this test, we include a dummy
variable (A) which will take a value of 1 for firms with less than or
equal to ten years in business, and of 0 for firms of greater age.
About 25% of the firms in our sample are owned by larger
insurance companies. This set up has been established by these companies
in order to keep the strict New York Insurance Regulations from governing
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the workings of the entire corporation. While the organizational and
accounting structures of these firms are entirely separate from the
parent company's, it is possible that some benefits accrue to these
firms for being part of a larger organization. In order to correct
for cost savings which might result from this relationship, we include
a dummy variable (OWN) in our equations which takes a value of 1 for
these owned companies.
As a result of the inclusion of these variables, the final
specification which we will employ in our analysis will contain the
following equations:
(la) AC = a + bQ + c MS + dA + f OWN + E
(2a) AC = a + bQ + cQ2 + dMS + fA+ g OWN+ e
(3a) log (AC) = a + b log Q + cMS + dA + f OWN +
where the variables are defined as above.
Because of the great variation in the size of the firms in
our sample, with the largest being over 5,000 times bigger than the
smallest firms, heterosoedasticity is a serious problem in our data.
Although the presence of heteroscedasticity will not affect the con-
sistency of our coefficient estimates, it will cause a loss in the
efficiency of our regression results. This lost efficiency could
have serious consequences with respect to the interpretation of the
results of a study such as this, in that inflated standard errors may
alter the outcome of significance tests for various coefficients. That
is, a failure to reject the null hypothesis that economies of scale do
not exist could result from imprecision in our coefficient estimates
rather than the true absence of such economies.
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The correction for the presence of heterocedacticity
in our data will be made by running weighted least squares on several
of.: our equations. In particular, we assume that the variance of
the error term (e) for each observation in the first two equations
is proportional to the size of the individual firm or observation raised
to some power alpha (a). Thus, we have for these equations that
var ei Q= i2Q , where 2 is a scalar component of the variance which
is common to all observations. In the case of the third equation, we
assume instead that the variance of the error term is proportional to
the logarithm of the size of the firm raised to some power alpha.
That is, we have for this equation that var ei = a2 (log Qi)a
where a2 is again a common component of the variance . On the basis
of these assumptions, we know that the proper method by which to correct
for heterocedacticity is achieved by dividing each variable by
the appropriate measure of size raised to the a/2 power for each ob-
servation, and running OLS on this transformed body of data. This
correction reestablished the scalar covariance matrix necessary for least
squares to produce the best linear unbiased estimation.
To estimate a value for alpha for each equation, we will uti-
lize a simple three step method. This method consists, first, of esti-
mating the original equation by OLS. The second step entails the cal-
culation of the residuals from the regression for each observation.
In the third step, you regress the square of these residuals on the
variable to which the variance of the error term is hypothesized to
be related. In our case, this third step is accomplished by running
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OLS on the equation:
2
log Ci = c + alog (f(Qi)) + u,
2 th
where e = the square of the i residual
f(Qi) = Qi for equations 1 and 2, and log Qi for equation 3.
From this regression, we obtain an efficient estimate of a which enables
us to run the weighted least squares procedure that we described above.
In addition to the presence of heteroscedasticity, the stochas-
tic specification in our equations may diverge from the specification
necessary to make OLS the appropriate procedure to obtain our coeffi-
cient estimates for two additional reasons. The first of these reasons,
which we mentioned above, is the possible occurence of simultaneous
equation bias. The second, and more likely problem which we will face
in our data, is the presence of errors in our measurement of output.
By this we mean, that our aggregate output measure, which will be de-
fined below, remains a proxy variable which we are using in place of
the true, but unobservable, output measure, Q*. It is a natural assump-
tion that the proxy will differ from Q* by a random error term, v.
That is,
Q* = Q+v
where we assume that E(v) = 0 and var(V) = ZI.
The presence of these biases represents a departure from the
stochastic specification necessary to invoke the Gauss-Markhov result
that OLS produces BLUE coefficient estimates. The departure in this
case carries with it far more serious consequences to our analysis than
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the presence of heteroscedasticity. Whereas heteroscedasticity merely
resulted in reduced estimation efficiency, the occurence of either
simultaneous equation bias or errors in variables will cause incon-
sistent coefficient estimates to result from the naive usage of OLS
to estimate our average cost equations. By this we mean, that even
as our sample grows infinitely large, our coefficient estimates will
fail to approach the "true" parameter values in these equations, but
will instead approach some other value in the limit with probability
approaching one.
In order to correct for the presence of either of these
sources of inconsistencies in our parameter estimates, we will employ
an instrumental variable procedure. It is a well known fact that such
a procedure, when correctly utilized, will produce consistent parameter
estimates for an equation in the face of either, or both, of these
problems. A word of caution is warranted here in that when employing
the method of instrumental variables care must be taken in the choice
of the candidates for the instrument. Notably, these candidates must
be correlated with the variable causing the inconsistencies, but remain
independent of the error term in the equation, for spurious correlation
between the right hand side variable and this error term is the under-
lying source of the original inconsistencies.
It should also be noted that the use of instrumental variables
serves two purposes in our analysis. In addition to correcting for
possible inconsistencies in our parameter estimates, it also represents
a means of obtaining evidence of the presence of these biasing influences.
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If we simplify our specification of equationsl and 3 by assuming
that we may lump our dummy variables into the constant term (thus
leaving us with a two variable case), it is easy to show that the
OLS coefficient estimate of the variable measured with error is
biased toward zero in the probability limit.5 On the other hand,
if simultaneous equation bias is present in this simplified model,
the OLS coefficient estimate, is biased toward 1.6 Since the true
coefficient of the size variable in both of these equations is certainly
less than or equal to 1, we see, therefore, that these sources of bias
will act in the same direction unless the scale coefficient is greater
than zero. It is unlikely, therefore, that the direction of move-
ments which this parameter estimates takes following the introduction
of instrumental variables into the estimation procedure will provide
any evidence as to which of these sources of inconsistencies is
causing any biases which we observe in our OLS results. Only the
general presence of inconsistencies may be established from this
knowledge.
The instrumental variable candidates, which we will employ
in our estimation, are members of a set of such cancidates suggested
by Wald, Durbin and others.7 All of these candidates are based on
the rank ordering of the variable responsible for producing inconsis-
tencies in the OLS estimates. The Wald candidate: is formed by assign-
ing a value of plus or minus 1 to each element position, according to
the corresponding element in the data matrix for the variable under
consideration is greater or less than the median value of that variable.
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Alternative candidates are based on the assignment of values to
elements according to the quantiles in which their corresponding
element in the original data matrix falls with respect to a rank
ordering of the variable being replaced. Probably, the most effi-
cient of these candidates is one which Durbin has suggested.
This candidate is formed by merely replacing the original elements
of a variable by their rank order.
Instrumental variables derived from the above class of
candidates, which we will henceforth refer to as Wald instruments
or candidates, were chosen for use in this study for one primary
reason. Simply, they were the only logical choice of candidates
available. In particular, while it is logical to assume that instru-
ments formed on the basis of these candidates possessed the necessary
prerequisites to achieving consistent estimators, no other candidate
could be found which would fulfill these conditions. Although the
instruments from these candidates are certainly correlated with our
size variable, it is unlikely that they would be correlated with the
error term in the equations in the plim (i.e., plim - w E = 0
After choosing from this list of candidates to form our
instruments, our instrumental variable estimator then becomes,
A -1b (w'x) w' yIV
where w is defined to be the instrumental variable
x is the original data matrix
y is the dependent variable.
-40-
Although our instrumental variable procedure provides con-
sistent parameter estimates, it will not provide efficient estimates
unless the underlying heterocedasticity in our data is also corrected.
To accomplish this we will employ a method which basically represents
running weighted least squares in conjunction with instrumental variables.
Under this approach, our estimator becomes:
b = (W'Q*-Q*-1X))-1 W'Q*-Q*-1y)
where W is the instrument
X is the original data matrix
Q is a diagonal matrix with Qi / 2 as the diagonal elements
y is the dependent variable.
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Model IV
1. For proof of this proposition see Henderson and Quandt, 1970,
pp. 77-84.
2. Ibid.
3. See Johnston (1972), pp. 278-291 and pp. 380-384.
4. Johnston (1972), p. 282.
5. Ibid, p. 344.
6. Ibid, p. 284-285.
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V. The Data:
The data for this study was gathered from the Annual Report of
the Superintendent of Insurance for New York for year ended
December 31, 1970.
Our sample consisted of sixty companies doing business in New
York state. The data was drawn from the annual statements of these
companies which were published in the above report.
A brief comparison of our sample with the total U.S. life
insurance industry indicates that the distinguishing characteristics
of our sample compare favorably with those of the industry in
general. While real estate, policy loans and mortgages accounted
for 3, 7.8 and 35.9 percent respectively of the total assets
invested by all U.S. life insurance companies in 1970, the corres-
ponding figures for our sample were 8.3, 10.3 and 31.6 percent.
The average size of an ordinary life insurance policy over all
U.S. life insurance companies was $6,110 in that year. The
average size of an ordinary policy in our sample was $5,844. As
far as the percentage of the market represented by our sample, our
sample accounted for 61.2 and 78.3 percent of the total ordinary
and group life insurance sold by U.S. firms respectively.1 Thus,
we see that on the basis of these comparisons our sample is a
good representation of the life insurance industry as it existed
in 1970. The only factor which would prevent the drawing of
assertive conclusions with respect to the structure of the life
insurance industry from our empirical results is our failure to
use random sampling techniques when we chose our sample.
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The fact that this study is being conducted on a regulated,
financial industry means that the problems associated with doing
empirical analysis on the basis of accounting data, which we
discussed in Section II, are less severe than they would be if
other types of industries were being studied. Because they are
regulated and produce very similar outputs, these institutions
tend to record their output and costs uniformly. Also, because
there are few externalities and only small amounts of inventories
or capital equipment are required, with most expenses coming in
the form of wages or supplies, accounting costs for these firms
corresponds closely to economic cost.2 Due to these properties,
we expect that cost curve analysis of this industry has significant
economic meaning.
The definition of cost which we employ is that cost is given
by the sum of commission fees and general insurance expenses.
Unfortunately, while output is being measured only with respect
to the life insurance and annuity business of these firms, these
costs include expenses attributable to the accident and health
insurance written by these firms, as well as their life insurance
output. As a result, our dependent variable contains a spurious
error component, which possesses a nonzero mean.
It is a well known econometric fact that error in the measurement
of the dependent does not affect the unbiased nature of OLS results,
as long as this error has mean zero. In order for us to invoke
this property of least-squares estimation, therefore, we must
transform our cost variable so that its error component has mean
zero. This transformation is accomplished by multiplying our cost
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variable by the fraction which the premiums stemming from the business
incorporated into our output measure represents of the total
premiums received by the firm. We assume that the residual error
in our measurement of the dependent variable following this
transformation has mean zero. As long as this assumption is correct,
the effect of the measurement error in the dependent variable is
only a reduction in the efficiency of our estimator, and does not
influence any of its consistency properties.
As we have described in prior sections of this report, the
definition of output which we use in our estimation is a composite
measure. This composite measure is formed on the basis of a
weighted sum of various products provided by these firms. The weights
used in this sum are unit cost measures taken from a study performed
by Geehan and Heishhorn (1975). The unit costs for the various
products which were formulated in that study were derived from the
report of the Expense Committee of the Canadian Institute of
Actuaries for 1971. These unit cost weights are reproduced in
Table 3.
In order to use the unit costs given in Table 3 as the basis for
creating our aggregate output measure, we must assume that these
unit costs are also relevent for the firms in our sample. Although
the original weights were derived from Canadian data, while our
sample consists entirely of U.S. companies, this assumption does
not appear to be too restrictive. We feel justified in making the
claim because of the great similarities between the Canadian and
American markets, and because of the wide range of contacts
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Table 3: Unit Costs (Weights) of Life Insurance Activities
Output Category
Ordinary Insurance
VFirst Year
Term and Temporary Additions
Basic Insurance
VRenewal
Term and Temporary Additions
Basic
Group Insurance
%/First Year
/Renewal
Ordinary Deferred Annuities
/First Year
JRenewal
%/Single Premium Annuities
Group Annuities
'First Year
VRenewal
VSingle Premium
Total Disability Waiver of Premium
Disability Insurance
Vested Annuities (ordinary and group)
JMortgage and Real Estate Assets
JPolicy Loans
Segregated Funds
/Balance of Ledger Assets
Unit Cost
$100.00 per policy
$ 10.92 per $1,000 new effected
$ 28.22 per $1,000 new effected
$ 7.10 per policy
$ 0.94 per $1,000 in force
$ 2.03 per $1,000 in force
$100.00 per policy
$ 1.35 per $1,000 new effected
$ 0.65 per $1,000 in force
$100.00 per policy
$ 31.25 per $1,000 annual
payment, new effected
80% of first year premium income
$ 6.60 per policy
$ 1.67 per $1,000 annual payment,
in force
4.5% of renewal premium income
5.0% of single premium income
(net dividends to policy-
holders)
$100.00 per policy
20% of premium income
10% of renewal premium income
3% of single premium income (net
of dividends to policyholders)
$ 0.12 per $1,000
$ 0.12 per $1,000
$ 12.00 per policy
0.32% of assets
0.64% of assets
0.18% of assets
0.12% of assets
in force
in force
($)($)($)($)
Notes: All dollar series are deflated by an appropriate price index;
see text. The unit costs in this Table are derived from the report
of the Expense Committee of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (1971).
Data for time series of each activity are taken from the annual reports
of the Superintendent of insurance for Canada, Volumes I and III. Data
limitations prevented us from extending the time series back prior to
1955.
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between the firms operating in these two countries.
The "products" that we include in our output measure are the
following: ordinary insurance (all classes), group insurance (all
classes), ordinary and group deferred annuities (all classes),
mortgage and real estate assets, policy loans, and the balance of
ledger assets. These items are denoted by a check next to their titles
in Table 3. The reader should not; however, that these products
do not comprise all of the output or service provided by the firms
in our sample. The variables which we do not include because of
insufficient data, or because they represent only a very insignificant
part of the total output of these firms are: total disability
waiver of premium, disability insurance, vested annuities, and
segregated funds. In addition to these variables, a portion of the
annuity business that we listed above as being incorporated into
our output measure, is also missing from our composite because
of the unavailability of data. This portion is the output measure
corresponding to the number of annuity policies and the amount of
annual payments credited to these policies. All of these missing
variables are indicated in Table 3 by the underlining of their
respective weights.
The portion of the theoretical composite output which is missing
in the output measure that we utilized represents a specification
error in the model we used in our estimation. Specifically, the
specification error is that of a mispecified explanatory variable,
and the result will be inconsistent estimation. It should be noted
also that the inconsistencies which are introduced in this way are
separate from those which stem from simultaneous equation bias,
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or errors in variables. Furthermore, the specification inconsis-
tencies may not be corrected through the use of instrumental
variables.
The impact of the specification error which we described in
the preceding paragraphs should not be overstated however. In
particular, available evidence indicates that the output measure
that we employ in our estimation procedures accounts for the
vast majority of the theoretical composite output. In the case
of the missing portion of the annuity business, data from the Canadian
industry indicates that this part represents only 8% of their
annuity output, which in turn makes up only about 12% of the total
output for these companies. Thus, we see that the annuity part
of the business, which we have left out of our composite measure,
results in our exclusion of roughly only 1% of the total, theoretical
composite output. Similar calculations for the other portions of
our "missing" output variable imply that all of these components
put together do not represent more than an additional 3% of the
total output. The output variable which provides the basis for
our empirical results, therefore, captures at least 95% of the
total, theoretical composite output.
The fact that we know the form of the mispecification error
allows us to predict the direction of the resulting bias in our
OLS size coefficients. It is easily shown that the expected
values of these coefficients in the presence of mispecification
error in the K- variable of these coefficients are given by
E(bo)h = Bh + PhK K h=f,...,K-1
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= PKK K h=K
where Sh is the hth element of the true coefficient vector;
boh is the hth element of the OLS coefficient vector;
and the p's are the coefficients of the following auxiliary
regression:
K-1
XaK PhKXaK + PKKK +h=l
* th
XaK and X being the (a,K) element of the true and mispecified
3data matrix respectively. Since, as we saw above, x K is approximately
equal to 1.053 X K' we expect that pKK would be positive in sign.
If the above relation between Xak and X K held exactly, the plim
of PKK, in fact, would be 1.053. Thus, we would expect a slight
upward or no bias in the absolute magnitude of the size coefficient
in our results on the basis of this analysis.
The biases occurring in the case of the dummy variable coefficients,
however, are less clearcut. Although the plim of these biases
would be zero if the above relation held exactly, this is unlikely
to be true, especially in the sample. Furthermore, we have no
basis for a priori prediction of the direction that these biases
may take (i.e., for the signs of PhK) given our sample. Thus, the
principle of insufficient reason dictates that we assume no biases
to be present in our estimates.
In the case of our instrumental variable estimates, it is not
practical to attempt the type of analysis which we invoked in
the preceding paragraphs. This realization arises from the fact
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that the asymptotic bias in our instrumental variable estimator due
to specification error is given by4
-1
plim (bv - = l(w'X) Iw'x
where 81 is the coefficient of the mispecified variable;
x is the data vector of the mispecified variable.
Since the direction of bias for all coefficients in this case
depends upon the value of w'x, which is unknown, no prediction
of the value or direction of this bias is possible for this
estimator.
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Data V
1. The figures describing the total U.S. insurance market were
taken from the Life Insurance Handbook for 1970, published
by the Life Insurance Institute in New York.
2. Benston, pp. 316-318.
3. Theil, p. 553.
4. Ibid, p. 552.
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VI. Results:
Before examining the results we achieved in our estimation,
we will first reiterate the basic rationale for this study, so
as to better put our results into perspective. This study represents
a reexamination of the presence of economies of scale in the life
insurance industry. The reappraisal of this issue is necessary,
because available evidence indicates that past conclusions with
respect to this topic were based on the results of biased and
inconsistent estimation procedures. This paper represents a
technical improvement over this prior work because it employs
a more theoretically acceptable measure of output, and because
various other sources of bias are considered and corrected for
whenever possible. Finally, as we indicated above, we approached
this issue with the hypothesis that inconsistent estimation had
produced the prior evidence of the existence of economies of
scale in the U.S. life insurance industry; and that sounder
estimation procedures would reverse this finding. This hypothesis
was based on the fact that, in our opinion, no good theoretical
justification for these size economies could be formulated.
Since a major motivational factor for conducting this study was
the belief that past work on this topic was in error, we began
our empirical analysis by rerunning a modified version of Houston
and Simon's model on our body of data. In the model we estimated,
we dropped their dummy variable for "bigness" from the list
of right hand side variables, and reinstated a dummy variable for
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market structure. The results of this estimation are contained
in Table 4.
A comparison of our results with those obtained by Houston and
Simon, which were reproduced in Table 1 above, shows that they
yield substantially the same conclusions. In particular, both
sets of results imply the presence of significant economies of
scale.1 The sign of the coefficients for new premiums and
group premiums also agreed with Houston sand Simon's finding and
a priori expectations. The coefficients for the industrial
premium and the lapse ratio failed to be statistically significant
in our results, but their respective point estimates were of the
appropriate sign.2
The only coefficient which contradicts Houston and Simon's
findings is that for the market structure dummy. To attain
correspondence with Houston and Simon's regressions, we ran our
regressions with this dummy defined to have a value of 1 for
mutual companies and 0 for stock companies. Thus, our prior
expectations would assign a positive sign to this variable's
coefficient. The fact that the opposite result attains very
significantly for our weighted regressions is a puzzling situation.
Since Houston and Simon never report a regression which contains
this variable, although they discuss theoretical reasons for its
presence, we cannot determine whether their point estimates
suffered from the same problem. While we offer no explanation
for the occurrence of this apparent sign reversal, we note that
it may be indicative of the presence of specification errors in
their model, with this variable acting as a proxy for an excluded
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Table 4
(Regressions: Houston " Simon's M1{odel)
S(P) R LH MS GP P 2  Sjy LoRr-L.
f(f)= lor(P)
OLS
.822 -.0284 .153 .28<  -.035 -.194 .141 .66 .078 ,7.94
(.128) (.0068)(.131) (.229) (.0242) (.0461) (.083) (
(6,44) (-4.19)(1.17) (1.24) (-1.44) (-4.19) (1.71)
Weivhted L.S.
608 -.0178 .251 .333 -.0599 -.168 .293
(.102) (.0052)(.130) (.220) (.0183) (.0325) (.0761)
(5.95) (-3.42) (1.94) (1.51) (-3.27) (-5.17) (3.85)
f(L) = I/I
OLS
8.-7 13 0 .092 .031 -.086 -.288 .262 .67 .084 63.
(.024) (226F5)(.134) (229) (.025) (.04) (.085)
(17.7) (3.59) (.69) (.14) (-3.5) (-7.15) (3.09)
veihted L.S.,
.2(7 107539 .219 .391 -.043 -.205 .328
(.014) (3156) (.131) (.221) (.01o) (.0315) (.0768)
(17.,4) (3.4) (1.65) (1.77') (-2.29) ( ,,.L9) (4.27)
f(P) =/10o,(l)
OLS
-. 1 b .75 .1 9 195 -. 3 -.1l9-  14 .Ir ./< .075 70.
,4 ( . 4.
(-1.7'7) (".75) (1.34) (. ,1) (-1.50) (-4.27) (1.88)
Weirhted L.S.
-. 072 7 T .247 .270 -.0" -.163 .286
(.086) (1,65) (.126) (.218) (.0178) (.0317) (.074)
(-.839) (3.93) (1.96) (1.24) (-3.4) (-5.14) (3.87)
Legend
See Table 1.
M'S = Market Structure Lummy
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variable.
The estimation results for our model are contained in Tables
5-7.3 A review of these tables shows that for each specification,
while the scale coefficient is insignificant for the least squares
and instrumental variables regressions which were uncorrected
for heteroscedasticity, the scale coefficient for the weighted
regressions, both least square and instrumental variables, is
statistically different from zero at greater than a 97.5% confidence
level in each case. The implication of this resulte. is that
prior studies were essentially correct in finding scale economies
for the life insurance industry.
A closer examination of the results shows them to be theoretically
sound in content. In each case, the change to statistical signifi-
cance of the coefficient of the size variable arose from a marked
reduction in the standard error of the estimate rather than a
large. change in its absolute value, in accordance with the theoretical
prediction for the effect of such a heteroscedasticity correction.
In view of the great size differentials present in our example,
it is not surprising, in fact, that the correction for heteroscedasticity
brought about such dramatic changes in the standard errors of our
estimates.
As we recall from our analysis in the preceding section, the
effect of the mispecification in our output measure is to cause a
slight upward bias in the absolute value of the size coefficients
for our OLS estimator, and a bias in determinable sign for our instrumental
variable estimator. In view of our determination of the slight extent of
our specification error, and the rather small impact that it is likely to have on
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Table 5
(Re ressions: AC = a + b Q + cC~ d.i + dM"IS + fA + e)
SQ OWN ,iS A R 2S Lor-L.
1.OLS
1.03 -.254E-9 -.279 -.154 -.153 .205 .2 28F
(,065) (.214E-9) (.088) (.078) (,106)
( 15.8) (-1.19) (-3.17) (-1.95) (-1.44)
2. WIei hhted L.S.
1.02 -.195E-9 -.351 -. 48 -. 164
(.07) (.o?05E-9) (.082) (.076) (.163)
(14.6) (-2.6) (-4.27) (-1.94) (-1.0)
IInstriumental Variables (IV)
1. 4 -. 72-7 E -. 274 -.135 -.158 .23
(.o06 ) (.373E- °) (.089) (.083) (.107)(15.7) (-1.24) (-3.06) (-1.51) (-1.47)
4.WcA iQhted IV
1.02 -. 34Lb-9 -.323 -. 111 -. 166
(o069) (.~ 154• -9) (o . ) ( .0 1) ( .1•i4 )
(14.7) (-2.25) (-3.83) (-1.38) (-1.1 )
lDurbin's candidate was used in forming the instruments.
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T
'able 6
AC = a + bQ + cQ.2 + cOvli'
SOWvi MS
+ di"S + fA + e)
R- Sy
1. OLS
1.041
(.0057)
( 158)
-. 912E-9
(.718E-9)
(-1.27)
2.Weighted L.S.
1.0324 -. 912E-9
(.068) (.333E-9)
(15.1) (-2.73)
3. I.V.
1.00" 2.47--9
(.115) (2.97E-9)((8.73) (.833)
94O3E-18
,982E-18)
.960)
898FE-18
.406E-18)
2.21)
-60. o5-18
.5.(-18)(-1.08)
-,iirbi n's cand.idate and Wiald's candidate, base,
~werne 'oIni the in str ire lts
o~r;O.2 ·l·.m-t~i. L 'brea~kdoun·rl,
(Regressions:
Lor-L.
,21 .22-. 2(3
.09)
-. 292)
.)-1n1,
081)
3.95)
-.342(.165)
(-2. 08)
417.8-. 136(.081)
(-1.49)
-. 105
(.076)
-1.37)
-. 132(.139)(-.94)
-, 168
(.107'
(-1.5 )
-. 192
(.163)
(-1.17)
-. 094
(.189)(-.50)
~ _Y~_I_ _ ___ _I~ ~__ ___ __ ~
1~1_ _·__LIY___1_3________ -- -· - -- -- - --
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Table 7
(lReressions:logAC = a + blo(Q) P + POW + dP1•S + fA + e)
'1
1.OLS
(.385)
(-16.(6)
lop( Q)
-. 0350
(.0243)
(-1.44 )
2. Wei4:hted L,S.
-6.23 -. 0439
(.313) (.0187)
(-19.9) (-2,34)
-3, I .V.
-•.59
(.398)
(-16.6)
-. 0209(.0251)
(-.83)
*Llurbin's candidate was used
.23 .291
Loa-L.
-10 ,99
OWN-
- 309
(,117)(-2.65)
-.350
(.107)
(-3.26)
-,328
(.117)
(-2,79)
-.356
(.108)
(-3.30)
-.1098
(.105)(-1.04)
-.0712
(.101)
(-.704)
-. 133(.106)
(-1.26)
-.0803
(.102)
(-.788)
-. 317
(.146)(-2.16)
-. 365
(.199)(-1,83)
-. 283
(.148)
(-1.92)
-. 354
(.200)
(-1.77)
4. Wei7hted I.V,.
2,29 -. 0,399
(.324) (.0195)
(-19.4) (-2.05)
,2915
·I --- - -- --·I-- ' ·1-·-Lo-ý) -- L.
-- I ----- ----- ------ " --
in forminr the instruments.
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our estimated coefficients, we reject this as a possible explanation
of our finding significant economies for all specifications for
both weighted least squares and weighted instrumental variable
estimators.
The only other variable, besides the constant and the output
measure, which attained statistical significance on the basis of
a two-tailed t-test ata 95% confidence level, is the dummy variable
that accounted for ownership by a larger firm. The coefficient
for this variable took the appropriate sign in accordance with
theoretical expectations for each specification. The large value
of this coefficient is somewhat surprising, however. Our results
indicate in fact, that the downward shift in the average cost
curve due to being a subsidiary is of the same magnitude as the
reduction in cost between our smallest and largest firms caused
by the presence of scale eocnomies. Thus, it appears that these
firms are able to take advantage of whatever size economies are
present in the controlling firm, even though their operations are
ostensibly independent in nature.
Although the coefficient of the market structure, dummy variable
is not statistically significant in any of our regressions, its
point estimate attained the appropriate sign in all cases. This is
an interesting result since it approaches statistical significance
in several regressions, and because of the inappropriate sign that
it attained under Houston and Simon's model. Our results indicate,
therefore, that the appropriate sign for this coefficient is indeed
negative (positive for Houston and Simon's model).
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The coefficient of the dummy variable which sought to correct
for organizational costs that might be present in new firms (A)
did not achieve statistical significance in any of our weighted
regressions. Its point estimate, nonetheless, differed in sign
from what theory predicted. The fact, however, that it only
neared significance for the logarithmic specification indicates
that this does not represent evidence of any major failings in
our specification. Furthermore, the occurrence of this incorrect
sign may result from the fact that this variable is positively
correlated (p=.25) with the ownership dummy. Thus, this
statistically insignificant deviation from theory may be due to
spurious correlation between two included variables.
In the two instances that instrumental variables produced
reasonable results, the direction in which the size coefficient
estimates shifted for the weighted instrumental variable estimator,
with respect to their original values under weighted least square,
differed between the two specifications. Specifically, the
coefficients increased in absolute value for the linear specification,
and decreased for the logarithmic specification. As we recall
from our prior analysis, the coefficients should have shifted
upward in value in the presence of either simultaneous equation
bias, or errors in variables. Although no rigorous statistical
test was conducted, we feel that, on the basis of this divergence
in coefficient movement, and because of the relatively small
magnitudes of the movements, it is unlikely that such a tst would
yield the result that the instrumental variable estimates were
significantly different from the least squares estimates. This
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inference indicates that the above sources of bias were not sig-
nificant in our data.
In addition to the question of the presence of statistically
significant economies of scale in the life insurance industry, the
issue of fundamental importance which underlies this study is
whether such economies, if present, are economically important.
This transition in the analysis to the economic interpretation
of statistical correlations, as Johnston shrewdly points out, is
always hazardous. In our results, although the size coefficient
is uniformly small in magnitude, the implied size eocnomies are
economically meaningful. In Figures 1-3 appear graphs of derived
cost functions. These figures represent depictions of equations
4, 2 and 4 from Tables 5, 6, and 7 respectively, and are included
as an aid to the reader in determining the extent of the size
eocnomies that are implied by the algebraic expressions. In each
case, the graphs are drawn for mutual companies, which are neither
new, nor subsidiaries of larger firms (i.e., all dummy variables
take the value zero).
As the reader can ascertain from these graphs, the differentials
in average costs stemming from scale economies over the range of
firm sizes in our sample represent reductions in average cost
of roughly 25% between the largest and smallest firms. Differen-
tials of this magnitude are indeed significant in any industry.
In closing this section, we would also like to note that the
results from our quadratic specification indicate the a U-shaped
average cost curve apparently fits our data as well as the other
specifications. Furthermore, two of our firms lie on the
Figure 1: Linear Regression Results
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upward sloping portion of the implied curve. This is interesting
in that empirical cost studies generally imply L-shaped cost
functions, as opposed to the U-shaped curves which are implied
by theory. No claim may be made, however, from our results that
such a U-shaped curve is actually the appropriate one for the
U.S. insurance industry.
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Results VI
1. The relevant t-statistic which enables the rejection of the
null hypothesis that the coefficient of the size variable
is zero is t > 1.68. In the case of the other variables,
since two-tailed tests are required for them, the appropriate
t-value is t > 2.01.
2. See footnote 1.
3. These tables provide the results for only the preferred speci-
fication with respect to our choice of an instrumental variable
candidate. Various other candidates were tried during preliminary
regressions, but the Durbin candidate provided the most efficient
estimates in all cases.
4. Note that this dummy value is defined in our model to take the
value one for stock companies and zero for mutual companies.
A negative coefficient is, therefore, what theory would predict.
5. Johnston (1958), p. 348.
-66-
Section VII. An Analysis of Market Structure
As we noted in the previous section, the magnitude of the
size economies implied by our point estimates of the slopes of our
various cost function specifications would be economically significant
for an industry such as insurance. Accordingly, our results contain
implications for the evolution and shape of the structure of the life
insurance industry. Thus, an indirect test of the soundness of our
statistical results may be performed by investigating the recent
behavior of the U.S. life insurance industry to see if these expected
features are present. To such an analysis we now turn our attention.
A possible implication of our results concerns the evolution
of the insurance industry. That is, if our results are correct and
significant economies of scale are present, we would expect to observe
a trend toward increasing market concentration. In order to test the
presumption, we constructed market concentration ratios on the basis of
total premium receipts and insurance in force for the past two decades
(for the tend largest life insurance companies). These concentration
ratios are tabulated in Table 8. Although simple concentration ratios
are an extremely inaccurate measure of market concentration, the figures
in Table 8 are quite disturbing. Instead of the rising concentration
trend we expected, we observe a dramatic reduction in market concentra-
tion over these years. Furthermore, while the movement seems to be
abating as measured by insurance in force, the decline seems to be
continuing on the basis of premium receipts.1
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In light of our market concentration figures, we are
faced with the problem of apparently contradicting results. Since
concentration ratios are very much summary statistics,
their inconsistency with our more detailed and elaborate statistical
investigation of the insurance industry need not necessarily be damning
to our previous results. In particular, there are four possible
explanations why such a conflict might be observed. These are:
1) behavior motivated by monopoly profits on the part of large firms;
2) the effect of entering companies, 3) the rise of insurance, and
4) the spatial distribution of firms.
It is certainly plausible that a profit maximizing company
which possesses a considerable amount of potential market power based
on economies of scale might choose not to exercise their ability to
drive smaller competitive firms out of the industry. Instead, in
accordance with dynamic limit pricing, they might choose to charge
prices which are greater than their marginal costs, thereby earning
monopoly profits, at the cost of allowing competition by medium sized
companies.2 If this were the case, the market concentration ratios
of these very large firms could decline over the years as the ranks of
the medium size companies expanded, or as the result of greater compe-
tition by medium size companies which are larger than the marginal
scale implied bythe prices dictated by the largest firms.
Although dynamic limit pricing represents a plausible explanation
for our results, it is difficult in practice to test for the existence of
such behavior by large firms. In particular, accurate information concerning
-68-
the economic profits earned by insurance companies is not readily obtainable,
so that a direct test of our hypothesis, by relating unit profits to firm
size, is not possible. In an effort to check the implications of this
hypothesis with respect to medium size firms, however, we calculated market
concentration ratios for the ten firms which ranked from 65th to 75th in
size over these years. The results are recorded in Table 9. While the
movement is less dramatic and more uneven than the decline for the
largest firms, the predicted upward trend is certainly apparent.
The rise, however, is small and the spectrum considered is narrow, so
that no definitive statement can be made on the basis of these figures
on whether the decline in market concentration by very large firms could
be accounted for by an expansion in market power by infra-marginal medium
size firms. Thus, we see that our evidence is too crude to enable any
meaningful conclusions with respect to the existence of dynamic limit
pricing behavior on the part of very large firms.
A second explanation for the inconsistencies in the evidence
in this field may be the rapid growth experienced by this industry
in recent years. That is, while the long run implications
of the presence of scale economies point toward a rise in market
concentration, the transient influx of a large number of small
firms may have reversed this trend over our observed period. In
addition, we note that this factor need not be thought of as independent
of our first explanation. In particular, the existence of dynamic limit
pricing on the part of firms would serve as an impetus for these small
firms to suffer through several initial lean years in the expectation
of recouping their losses through future excess profits once they have
achieved the requisite size.
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The growth of this industry over the past two decades has been
very substantial. Half of the 1465 companies operating in 1963 were
less than 10 years old. By 1968, an additional 300 companies had been
formed. In light of the magnitude of this proliferation of insurance
firms, the impact of these new firms could easily have been a significant
factor in the observed downward trend in market concentration. A word of
caution, however, should be made in that our figures are only suggestive,
and that a more thorough analysis in the future should be made to
examine whether the prediction of dynamic limit pricing of an initial
"lean" period for entering firms is substantiated, and to determine the
actual impact of these new firms on market concentration.
With respect to the final two rationalizations, our reasoning
is that in the present of reinsurance, the smaller firms may be thought
of as in effect representing agents for larger firms, and
that the observed concentration ratios may be misleading if this is
not accounted for. As far as spatial distribution is concerned, it
might be that the cost reudctions from size economies are significant
only when operatingin larger urban markets. As a result, the large
companies may have avoided high cost rural areas, leaving them to small
regional firms. A disproportionate rise in rural life insurance could
then account for part of the observed decline in market concentration.
Available evidence, however, indicates that reinsurance is not a
significant factor in the life insurance industry. Furthermore, the
argument for differential emphasis by large firms between communities
of various sizes is compelling neither on theoretical grounds, especially
since independent agents may be used, nor on the basis of empirical
observation, since all the largest firms are chartered in all 50
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states and employ thousands of field representatives. (See Table 10)
In summary, we find that the economic implications of our cost
function estimations seem to be at variance with the actual experience
of the life insurance industry in recent years. In an effort to explain
this fact, while maintaining the correctness of our basic results, we
considered four hypotheses. Of these, only the presence of dynamic
limit pricing behavior by the largest firms, and the impact of the
proliferation of many new firms during this period appear to be
reasonable explanations at this time. These hypotheses show, however,
that conclusions concerning the validity of our cost function estimates
may be misleading when based on simplistic, aggregate market
measures. In addition, while the behavior of market concentration
ratios in recent years is not able to repudiate our findings by itself,
it does demonstrate the necessity of examining your statistical results
in light of independent information that is relevant to your
analysis. Accordingly, we note that our findings must be regarded
as tentative awaiting further market investigation and refined
statistical estimates.
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1. While both measures are fraught with problems, premium receipts
is a superior basis for measuring market concentration since it is
better able to capture the diverse nature of these companies'
"outputput".
2. See Gaskings (1971).
3. It should be noted that this empirical evidence is weak in that
a finer breakdown between metropolitan and rural sales effort according
to size is the measure actually desired. Such conformation, however,
is not presently available.
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Table 8
Concentration Ratio of Ten Largest Firms (%)
On Premium Basis
59.88
58.87
57.66
55.77
53.94
52.55
49.98
49.34
48.2
45.86
On Basis of Ins. in Force
55.23
53.25
51.90
49.96
47.46
45.72
45.85
46.4
Table 9
Concentration Ratio of "Medium" Size Firms (On
Basis of Ins. in Force)
.0202
.0206
.0211
.0219
.0223
.0212
.0214
.0221
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
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Table 10
Company Statistics
Company (In Order of Size, 1975) # of States Covered # of Field
Representatives
Prudential
Metropolitan
Equitable
John Hancock
Aetna
(1590 offices)
+25,000
6,600
10,900
2,400
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research
In summary, the findings of this study demonstrate that
past authors in this topic were correct in finding economically
significant economies of scale in the U.S. live insurance industry. While
fault may be found with their methodology in approaching this question,
their basic conclusions have withstood the scrutiny of our analysis.
Neither the introduction of a composite output measure, nor the
use of superior estimation techniques, succeeded in altering this
theoretically perplexing conclusion.
With respect to future research, our analysis has demonstrated
that certain key issues remain unresolved. The outcome of our study
raises the question, if economies of scale of the magnitude implied
by our estimates are present, why are there over 1,700 insurance companies
operating in the American market? Is it because of market imperfections
with respect to pricing policies? In an effort to gainsome insights
into the nature of the life insurance market and deal with these questions,
we looked at the evolution of market concentration for his industry.
As we saw, however, this superficial investigation failed to provide
any meaningful results. A much more detailed analysis of the life insurance
market and industry organization is necessary to place our empirical
findings in aproper perspective. Unfortunately, such an analysis is
beyond the scope of this report.
In another direction, future studies could look at insurance
companies in a more refined light. These analyses could break the
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insurance firms into sub-components, such as the investment
component of the firm, to determine in exactly which of these
components economies of scale are arising. Ideally, a production
function for the insurance industry could be worked out. Not
only would such a function provide an answer to the question of which
components possess economies of scale; but it would also provide less
ambiguous conclusions since that approach would avoid the theoretical
complications associated with utilizing cost functions to investigate
a technological phenomena. Through investigations such as these, a
good theoretical justification for what is now merely an empirical
observation for the insurance industry may be found.
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